Partisan Movement in the Patriotic War of 1812

Partisan Movement in the Patriotic War of 1812

 

the armed struggle of the Russian popular masses, chiefly the peasants, and of detachments of the Russian Army, in the rear and on the lines of communication of Napoleon’s troops. The partisan movement demonstrated that the Patriotic War of 1812 was a just war.

The peasants’ resistance to the foreign invaders began spontaneously in Lithuania and Byelorussia after the retreat of the Russian Army. At first, the peasants abandoned villages en masse and destroyed foodstuffs and forage. The partisan movement broke out on a large scale in late July and early August in Smolensk Province and later in Moscow and Kaluga provinces, where armed detachments of peasants attacked separate, isolated groups of the enemy, as well as enemy supply trains. Peasant detachments led by G. M. Kurin, S. Emel’ianov, V. Polovtsev, V. Kozhina, and E. V. Chetvertakov became especially well known. The tsarist government was initially distrustful of the peasant partisan movement. However, as patriotic fervor rose, some landlords organized partisan detachments of peasants. Army detachments were also formed to engage in partisan operations in the enemy rear. The first of these, made up of 130 men, was organized by Lieutenant Colonel D. V. Davydov in late August 1812. Commander in chief M. I. Kutuzov, who attached great importance to the partisan movement, assisted in organizing army partisan detachments, issued instructions on their armament and tactics, and tried to subordinate the partisan movement to his strategic concepts and to give it an organized character. In September the army partisan detachments included 36 cossack regiments, seven cavalry regiments, five squadrons, five infantry regiments, and three battalions. Among the officers leading the army detachments were D. V. Davydov, I. S. Dorokhov, A. N. Seslavin, A. S. Figner, and M. A. Fonvizin.

Many peasant detachments merged with army detachments or acted in coordination with them, and units of the people’s militia were brought into partisan operations. In September and early October army and peasant partisan detachments surrounded Moscow, attacking enemy lines of communication, capturing supply trains, and killing foragers. Information about the enemy communicated by the partisans was very important. Army partisan detachments struck at enemy garrisons and reserves and liberated several cities, including Vereia. In the five-week period after the battle of Borodino, Napoleon’s army lost about 30,000 men as a result of partisan operations. During the retreat of Napoleon’s army, partisans assisted regular units in pursuing and destroying enemy troops, thus playing an important role in the rout of Napoleon’s army.

REFERENCES

Davydov, D. V. Dnevnik partizanskikh deistvii 1812. [Moscow] 1942.
Davydov, D. V. Opyt teorii partizanskogo deistviia, 2nd ed. Moscow, 1822.
Davydov, D. V. Voennye zapiski. Moscow, 1940.
Beskrovnyi, L. G. Otechestvennaia voina 1812 g. Moscow, 1962.
Bychkov, L. N. Krest’ianskoe partizanskoe dvizhenie v Otechestvennoi voine 1812. Moscow, 1954.
Zhilin, P. A. Gibel’ napoleonovskoi armii v Rossii. Moscow, 1968.

V. P. GLUKHOV