> as lemmas

1902 C. Hague tr. F. C. Brentano Origin Knowl. Right & Wrong 12 The common feature of everything psychical consists in what has been called by a very unfortunate and ambiguous term, consciousness; i.e. in a subject-attitude; in what has been termed an intentional relation to something which, though perhaps not real, is none the less an inner object of perception.

1931 W. R. B. Gibson tr. E. Husserl Ideas ii. ii. 122 The intentional object..first becomes an apprehended object through a distinctively ‘objectifying’ turn of thought.

1931 W. R. B. Gibson tr. E. Husserl Ideas ii. ii. 133 Apart from perception, we find a variety of intentional experiences which essentially exclude the real immanence of their intentional objects.

1957 R. M. Chisholm Perceiving xi. 169 The phenomena most clearly illustrating the concept of ‘intentional existence’ are what are sometimes called psychological attitudes; for example, desiring, hoping, wishing, seeking, believing, and assuming.

1976 A. R. Lacey Dict. Philos. 99 Since Brentano, who brought these issues to light and revived some medieval terminology, objects like Cicero, Apollo and unicorns, in these contexts, are called intentional objects, and are sometimes said to have intentional inexistence (existence in the mind, or as an object of the mind's activity).

1986 Brit. Jrnl. Aesthetics Autumn 394 Beliefs about fictitious persons are ‘second order’ beliefs about ‘intentional objects’.