| 释义 |
‖ petitio|pɪˈtɪʃɪəʊ, pəˈtiːtɪəʊ|
[L.: see next.]
The Latin word for ‘asking, begging, petitioning, petition’, used in some phrases: esp.
‖ petitio induciarum, Law = imparlance 2.
1706in Phillips. 1847Craig s.v. Petition, Petitio induciarum, the same in the civil law as imparlance in the common law; namely, a motion made to the declaration of the plaintiff by the defendant, whereby he craves respite, or another day, to put in his answer.
‖ petitio principii |pɪˈtɪʃɪəʊ prɪnˈsɪpɪaɪ|, Logic [lit. begging or taking for granted of the beginning or of a principle], a logical fallacy which consists in taking for granted a premiss which is either equivalent to, or itself depends on, the conclusion, and requires proof; an instance of this; a ‘begging the question’.
1531Tindale Expos. 1 John v. 1–3 Wks. (1573) 420/1 Which kynde of disputyng schole men call Petitio principii, the prouyng of two certaine thynges, eche by the other, and is no prouyng at all. 1565Jewel Repl. Harding Wks. 1848 II. 339 This argument is called petitio principii, which is, when a thing is taken to make proof, that is doubtful, and standeth in question, and ought itself to be proved. 1646Sir T. Browne Pseud. Ep. i. iv. (1686) 11. 1668 Dryden Def. Ess. Dram. Poesy Ess. (ed. Ker) I. 132 Here you see, instead of proof, or reason, there is only petitio principii. 1761Sterne Tr. Shandy IV. Introd., Had it not been for a petitio principii..the whole controversy had been settled at once. 1827Whately Logic iii. §3. 142. 1887 Fowler Deduct. Logic (ed. 9) viii. 145 The argument in a circle is the most important case of the fallacy called Petitio Principii (or, as it is more properly called, Petitio Quæsiti, begging the question). |